In 2013, MITRE released Copernicus 1, a best-effort system to capture a raw dump of the BIOS and whether it appears to be possible for an attacker to write to it. In 2014, we released Copernicus 2 to combat the ability of an attacker to subvert not just Copernicus 1, but all other BIOS capture systems. While these free tools are a good way to get a copy of your BIOS, analyzing it to detect malicious changes is still an open problem in need of further investigation before defenders can feel confident that they have un-infected BIOS. You can't just compare the MD5s from two BIOS dumps and get a valid comparison. This is a problem that leads to firmware-level malware going under-reported and under-analyzed due to not enough people with the background to jump into this area.
In this presentation, we will assume that you have a suspected badBIOS dumped by Copernicus that you'd like to determine the integrity and authenticity of. We will perform a breadth-first discussion of the topics such as port IO, memory-mapped IO, PCI, SMM, UEFI, and others that you need to become more familiar with in order to effectively analyze modern BIOSes. We will especially focus on how UEFI's removal of security through obscurity is a double edged sword which helps both attackers and defenders analyze BIOSes for attacks or integrity checks. This talk will serve as a gateway for people with existing reverse engineering knowledge to start analyzing modern PC firmware.