Signal handling has been an integral part of UNIX systems since the earliest implementation in the 1970s. Nowadays, we find signals in all common flavors of UNIX systems, including BSD, Linux, Solaris, Android, and Mac OS. While each flavor handles signals in slightly different ways, the implementations are very similar. In this paper, we show that signal handling can be used as an attack method in exploits and backdoors. The problem has been a part of UNIX from the beginning, and now that advanced security measures like ASLR, DEP and stack cookies have made simple exploitation much harder, our technique is among the lowest hanging fruit avalailable to an attacker. Specifically, we describe Sigreturn Oriented Programming (SROP), a novel technique for exploits and backdoors in UNIX-like systems. Like return-oriented programming (ROP), sigreturn oriented programming constructs what is known as a ‘weird machine’ that can be programmed by attackers to change the behavior of a process. To program the machine, attackers set up fake signal frames and initiate returns from signals that the kernel never really delivered. This is possible, because UNIX stores signal frames on the process’ stack. Sigreturn oriented programming is interesting for attackers, OS developers and academics. For attackers, the technique is very versatile, with pre-conditions that are different from those of existing exploitation techniques like ROP. Moreover, unlike ROP, sigreturn oriented programming programs are portable. For OS developers, the technique presents a problem that has been present in one of the two main operating system families from its inception, while the fixes (which we also present) are non-trivial. From a more academic viewpoint, it is also interesting because we show that sigreturn oriented programming is Turing complete. We demonstrate the usefulness of the technique in three applications. First, we describe the exploitation of a vulnerable web server on different Linux distributions. Second, we build a very stealthy proof-of-concept backdoor. Third, we use SROP to bypass Apple’s code signing and security vetting process by building an app that can execute arbitrary system calls. Finally, we discuss mitigation techniques.